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Abstract 
Deliberate rule violations have typically been addressed from a motivational perspective 
that asked whether or not agents decide to violate rules based on contextual factors and 
moral considerations. Here we complement motivational approaches by providing a 
cognitive perspective on the processes that operate during the act of committing an 
unsolicited rule violation. Participants were tested in a task that allowed for violating traffic 
rules by exploiting forbidden shortcuts in a virtual city maze. Results yielded evidence for 
sustained cognitive conflict that affected performance from right before a violation 
throughout actually committing the violation. These findings open up a new theoretical 
perspective on violation behavior that focuses on processes occurring right at the moment 
a rule violation takes place. 
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Human agents are motivated to minimize the energy they have to invest in performing a 
task at hand, and reaching this goal sometimes implies that agents come up with solutions 
that do not necessarily comply with accepted protocols, norms, and rules. 
Such deliberate rule violations have been recognized as a prevalent issue in the 
context of workplace- and safety-related behavior, and previous studies aimed at 
uncovering the organizational, personal, and situational factors that give rise to rule-
violations (Berry, Ones, & Sackett, 2007; Jacobsen, Fosgaard, & Pascual-Ezama, 2018; 
Reason, 1990; Yap, Wazlawek, Lucas, Cuddy, & Carney, 2013). A prominent class of 
violation-producing conditions includes moral considerations like moral licensing, 
misperceptions of possible hazards and inattention to moral standards, thus highlighting 
psychological processes that may bias decision-making toward rule violations (Mazar, 
Amir, & Ariely, 2008; Moore & Gino, 2015; Reason, 1995). 
Research that aims at predicting rule violations as a function of certain violation-
producing conditions focuses on the binary outcome of observing whether or not a given 
agent violates a given rule. This approach has been highly successful in applied studies 
on rule-violation behavior because it can inform decision-making in the field (Mazar & 
Ariely, 2006; Parker, Reason, Manstead, & Stradling, 1995; Runciman, Merry, & Walton, 
2007). At the same time, however, this approach does not allow for a precise and 
comprehensive understanding of rule violations from a psychological perspective because 
it does not address the cognitive, motivational, and affective processes that are at work for 
an individual agent right at the moment that they violate a rule. Recent studies have 
therefore begun to explore an agent-centered approach on deliberate rule violations 
(Pfister, Wirth, Schwarz, Steinhauser, & Kunde, 2016a; Wirth, Pfister, Foerster, 
Huestegge, & Kunde, 2016).1 These studies have documented sustained cognitive conflict 
during rule-violation behavior that arises due to a continued representation of the rule. 
Conflict became evident in analyses of movement trajectories that were attracted to the 
rule-based response option in case of rule violations, and also in electrophysiological 
                                                          
1 We have previously labeled the two approaches to rule violations as adopting either a third-
person or a first-person perspective, with “third-person” referring to studies that assess predictors 
and precursors of rule-violation behavior as well as its observable consequences, and “first-person” 
referring to the study of psychological processes during the act of committing a rule violation 
(Jusyte et al., 2017; Wirth, Foerster, Rendel, et al., 2018). The label of an agent-centered approach 
for the latter type of studies is used here following suggestions that were raised in the review 
process. 
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measures that suggested less direct response retrieval for rule violations than for rule-
based responses (Pfister et al., 2016b). Measures of cognitive conflict were further 
correlated with the likelihood of deciding for rule violations across participants, with larger 
costs going along with fewer rule violations. 
Previous studies on cognitive conflict during deliberate rule violations focused on 
the violation of simple classification rules (Jusyte et al., 2017; Pfister et al., 2016a; Wirth et 
al., 2016). This focus allowed for studying the minimal defining feature of rule violations; 
that is: knowing the behavior that is prescribed by a rule but deliberately performing an 
alternative course of action.2 Participants in these studies classified targets based on an 
arbitrary mapping rule by moving the mouse cursor from a home area in the bottom center 
of the computer screen to a target area in the upper-left or upper-right corner of the 
screen. The mapping rule indicating the correct response to each stimulus was instructed 
at the beginning of the experiment, but participants were encouraged to break this rule 
from time to time during the experiment by deliberately performing an incorrect movement. 
Such a setup provides a principled approach to cognitive processing during rule-violation 
behavior, but at the same time this design choice comes with the limitation of omitting 
motivational contributions to rule-breaking (with rule violation being embedded in the 
“meta-rule” of breaking the existing mapping rule at times; Gozli, 2017). 
Experimental approaches that aim at isolating elementary process components 
such as cognitive conflict come with a lasting tradition in psychology, though recent work 
has called for a more holistic approach to the phenomena under investigation (Gozli & 
Deng, in press; Kingstone, Smilek & Eastwood, 2008). The present study followed the 
latter spirit and aimed at investigating cognitive conflict during unsolicited, motivated rule 
violations, thus providing a bridge between basic, cognitive approaches and applied and 
economic approaches (cf. van Kleef, Wanders, Stamkou, & Homan, 2015; Verschuere & 
Shalvi, 2014). 
                                                          
2 A similar argument can be made for studies that aim at isolating specific cognitive processes 
involved in lying (e.g., Debey, De Houwer, & Verschuere, 2014; Spence et al., 2001). We will get 
back to the topic of lying in the General Discussion. 
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Rule violations can be motivated by a broad range of factors. Economic studies of 
rule-violation behavior have typically focused on cheating by investigating situations in 
which individuals can violate a rule or norm in order to attain monetary advantages (Dai, 
Galeotti, & Villeval, 2018; Fischbacher & Föllmi‐Heusi, 2013; Gächter & Schulz, 2016; 
Gneezy, 2005; Hilbig & Hessler, 2013). Participants are thus motivated to either increase 
their payoffs or to prevent monetary losses in these situations (Schindler & Pfattheicher, 
2017). Studies in workplace- and safety-related settings, by contrast, have often focused 
on non-monetary motives by investigating shortcutting behavior that is typically labelled as 
a routine or optimizing violation (Dommes, Granié, Cloutier, Coquelet, & Huguenin-
Richard, 2015; Kimbrough & Vostroknutov, 2015; Reason, 1990; Runciman et al., 2007). 
Routine and optimizing violations both describe behavior in which agents depart from an 
operating procedure or rule to render the task more enjoyable. Routine violations mainly 
comprise situations in which the agent short-cuts one or more steps that would be 
required by a protocol in order to expedite task performance, whereas optimizing 
violations typically describe situations in which the agent performs unusual actions to 
enrich a low-demand task (“violations for kicks”; Reason, 1995; Runciman et al., 2007). 
We will use a broader connotation of the term optimizing violations in the following to refer 
to both situations. 
As a first step towards investigating cognitive conflict for motivated rule violations, 
we opted to study optimizing violations in an applied setting: taking forbidden shortcuts 
while navigating in traffic. An advantage of studying such rule violations is that traffic rules 
are explicitly defined which renders forbidden shortcutting a salient event. To measure this 
type of rule-related shortcutting behavior, we asked our participants to take control of a 
virtual bicycle courier delivering a pizza in a two-dimensional city map as shown in Figure 
1. The only instruction was to deliver the pizza as quickly as possible and participants 
were informed that they could leave as soon as the last pizza had been delivered. 
Crucially, we implemented one-way roads in some of the maps, and violating these one-
way roads could speed up the delivery at times. Accordingly, we expected participants to 
be motivated to use these shortcuts (i.e., to perform optimizing violations) and studied 
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whether they would experience cognitive conflict in these situations. We further expected 
participants to differ substantially regarding their frequency of rule-violations, following 
findings on rule and norm violations in terms of cheating and lying (DePaulo, Kashy, 
Kirkendol, Wyer, & Epstein, 1996, Halevy, Shalvi, & Verschuere, 2014; Kimbrough & 
Vostroknutov, 2015; Mazar & Ariely, 2006), and this frequency difference should be 
related to cognitive conflict, with strong cognitive conflict going along with fewer decisions 
in favor of violating rules. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Exemplar trial of the pizza task to measure violation behavior. 
Participants navigated a bicycle courier (here: top-left corner) to deliver a 
virtual pizza (goal location; bottom-right corner) and each keypress moved 
the courier on the road for one tile (10 x 8 tiles in total). Some roads could 
be designated as one-way and shortcutting these roads in the forbidden 
direction could speed up task performance. 
 
 
Taking shortcuts  7 
 
Experiment 1 
The main question of Experiment 1 was whether cognitive conflict during rule 
violation would emerge for unsolicited, motivated rule violations such as taking a forbidden 
shortcut (Hypothesis 1). Cognitive conflict can be assessed in the current experimental 
paradigm by analyzing the participants’ inter-keystroke intervals while performing the 
tasks: Entering a one-way road in the forbidden direction should induce conflict which 
should temporarily slow down responding, indicated by prolonged inter-keystroke intervals 
(see Logan & Crump, 2010, for a similar method applied to typing behavior). As a second 
question, we assessed whether the strength of this conflict would be related to the 
individuals’ tendency to violate rules (Hypothesis 2). Following previous findings on 
cognitive conflict during deliberate rule violations (Pfister et al., 2016a), we expected 
stronger conflict to go along with fewer rule violations as assessed by a correlation with 
the frequency of rule-violation behavior across participants.3 
Method 
Participants and power analyses 
Seventy-two undergraduate psychology students participated for course credit (61 
females, 8 left-handers). Their mean age was 20.5 years (range: 18-29 years). This 
sample size ensured a high power of 1-β > .99 for the effect size reported in previous 
studies (e.g., d z = 0.95 for the effect of rule compliance on initiation times in the “violation 
group” of Exp. 1 in Pfister et al., 2016a). Assuming that the less controlled setting of the 
present experiments reduces the effect size to a medium effect of dz ≥ .50, this sample 
would still imply a power of 1-β ≥ .99 for detecting relevant conflict effects. Finally, the 
chosen sample sizes allowed for a power of 1-β = .80 for detecting correlations of at least 
medium size (r ≥ .30). Power calculations were done using the native “power.t.test” and 
the “pwr.r.test” function of the “pwr” package version 1.1-3 running in R3.3.0. For all power 
analyses, we assumed α = .05 and a directional test of our main hypotheses (note that we 
                                                          
3 As an additional research question, we explored whether the individual proneness to commit rule 
violations in the pizza task could be predicted by the individual’s tendency to employ cognitive 
shortcuts as measured in an unrelated categorization task (Pashler & Bayliss, 1991). This was not 
the case. A more detailed theoretical justification and description of these analyses can be found in 
the Supplementary Material. 
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still report two-tailed rather than one-tailed tests to follow common reporting standards). 
One participant partly guessed the purpose of the experiment and was replaced. The 
study protocol was approved by the local ethics committee. 
Pizza task: Measuring optimizing violations 
For the pizza task, participants responded with the four arrow keys of a standard 
German QWERTZ keyboard to navigate a bicycle courier through city-like 2D-mazes (see 
Fig. 1). Mazes consisted of 10 x 8 tiles (1.5 cm x 1.5 cm) and each map contained roads, 
non-passable houses, and a goal location that was signaled by a pizza icon. Some maps 
additionally contained one or more designated one-way roads. 
Pressing a key moved the courier forward one tile and the bicycle movement was 
always coded relative to the (global) map rather than the (local) courier orientation, i.e., 
pressing the left arrow moved the bicycle one tile to the left on the screen, irrespective of 
the bicycle’s orientation. The program logged responses, inter-keystroke intervals, and 
corresponding bicycle locations throughout the trial. The trial ended as soon as the bicycle 
reached the goal location. The final map stayed on screen for 500 ms and the next trial 
started after an additional interval of 1000 ms. 
The experiment started with a training block of five maps that did not contain any 
one-way roads and participants were not informed about these upcoming stimuli. Then, 
the experimenter left the room and the participant worked through two blocks of 60 trials 
each. The two blocks used the same maps in a fixed sequence. Overall, the participants 
thus completed 120 trials, 30 of which did not contain any one-way roads, 20 contained 
one-way roads that did not help to cut short to the goal location if used in the forbidden 
direction, and 70 contained one-way roads that helped to cut short to the goal location by 
violating the indicated direction. 
Participants further performed a short additional task to measure their tendency to 
employ cognitive shortcuts in a categorization task (Pashler & Baylis, 1991) and they 
completed an ad-hoc questionnaire targeting their subjective views on rule-violation 
behavior after completing the experimental task (see the Supplementary Material for 
details). 
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Results 
Cognitive conflict during one-way violations 
A first analysis aimed at characterizing the distribution of one-way violations across 
participants (Fig. 2, left panel).4 Descriptively, this distribution exhibited two separate 
modes, one at each end of the scale. To quantify this visual impression, we computed two 
statistics: The bimodality coefficient and Hartigan’s dip test (Freeman & Dale, 2013; 
Pfister, Schwarz, Janczyk, Dale, & Freeman, 2015). The bimodality coefficient amounted 
to b = .679, clearly exceeding the cut-off value of bcrit = .555 that would be expected for a 
uniform distribution (Knapp, 2007). Furthermore, the dip test for unimodality (Hartigan & 
Hartigan, 1985) was significant, dip = 0.095, p < .001, indicating a non-unimodal 
distribution. 
To test Hypothesis 1, i.e., to probe for cognitive conflict as assessed via inter-
keystroke intervals, we distinguished between the very first violation trial and all following 
violation trials. This was done, because we had chosen not to inform the participants 
about existence and function of one-way roads during the introduction so that the first act 
of violation likely involved uncertainty of what to expect when entering the one-way road in 
the forbidden direction. The analysis could thus only be run for participants who 
committed at least two violations across the experiment and did not produce any missing 
data during the first violation, e.g., by reversing direction right after entering the one-way. 
This procedure resulted in n = 48 usable data-sets, thus providing a power of 1-β = .96 (or 
1-β = .92 when assuming a two-tailed test). 
For all participants of the final sample, we calculated mean inter-keystroke 
intervals for four conditions: (1) keystrokes during a violation trial that were unrelated to 
the violation itself (i.e., keypresses that were not performed in or right before entering a 
one-way), (2) keystrokes right before entering a one-way in the forbidden direction, (3) 
keystrokes that initiated the violation (i.e., entering the one-way), and (4) keystrokes while 
heading through the one-way in the forbidden direction (see Fig. 2, right panel). Of main 
                                                          
4 Note that this analysis only included trials in which passing through the one-way road in the 
forbidden direction served as a shortcut (70 trials per participant). One-way roads for which a 
violation did not help to shorten the path were used too rarely to allow for meaningful analyses. 
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interest was the comparison of inter-keystroke intervals when entering a one-way in the 
forbidden direction as compared to violation-unrelated keystrokes, which provides a direct 
test for Hypothesis 1. The two remaining keystroke types were mainly included for 
exploratory analyses. Keystrokes right before entering a one-way allow for evaluating 
cognitive conflict in a situation in which participants could still turn around and take a rule-
conform route. Keystrokes while heading through the one-way, by contrast, allow for 
assessing behavior while performing a series of consecutive rule-breaking actions (as 
compared to measures of one instance of rule-violation behavior; e.g., Pfister et al., 
2016a).  
Inter-keystroke intervals deviating by more than 2.5 standard deviations from their 
cell mean were considered outliers (3.1%). Because the very first violation of each 
participant was treated separately, the inter-keystroke interval data were analyzed by a 4 
x 2 repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) with the factors keystroke type (as 
described above) and violation order (first vs. following violations; see Tab. 1 for complete 
descriptive statistics). 
Most importantly, the described ANOVA revealed a main effect of keystroke type, 
F(3, 141) = 12.95 (ε = .51), p < .001, ηp2 = .22, driven by slow responses when initiating the 
violation on the one hand, and short inter-keystroke intervals while passing through the 
one-way on the other hand (as compared to violation-unrelated responses). Additionally, 
keystrokes during the first violation trial were overall slower than those of the remaining 
trials, F(1, 47) = 33.75, p < .001, ηp2 = .42, and the effect of keystroke type was stronger 
for the first violation than for the remaining violations, F(3, 141) = 3.23 (ε = .59), p = .048, 
ηp2 = .07. Separate pairwise comparisons indicated that the inter-keystroke interval when 
entering the one-way was significantly longer than violation-unrelated inter-keystroke 
intervals for the first violation (Δ = 115 ms), t(47) = 2.90, p = .006, d = 0.42, as well as for 
the following violations (Δ = 40 ms), t(47) = 5.94, p < .001, d = 0.86. Similarly, inter-
keystroke intervals while passing the one-way were significantly shorter than unrelated 
ones for the first violation (Δ = -49 ms), t(47) = -3.31, p = .002, d = -0.48, and also for the 
following violations (Δ = -25 ms), t(47) = -11.10, p < .001, d = -1.60. The difference 
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between unrelated inter-keystroke intervals and inter-keystroke intervals right before the 
violation did not approach significance for either comparison (ps > .320). 
 
Tab. 1. Mean inter-keystroke intervals in milliseconds for both experiments and all experimental 
conditions. Standard errors of paired differences (SEPD) show the within-subject standard error 
when comparing each condition to the baseline condition of violation-unrelated responses (cf. 
Pfister & Janczyk, 2013). 
  
Keystroke Type 
 
SEPD 
 
Violation 
order 
Violation- 
Unrelated 
Before 
Violation 
Entering 
One-Way 
Passing 
One-Way 
 
Before 
Violation 
Entering 
One-Way 
Passing 
One-Way 
Exp. 1 First 255 278 371 209 
 
23 40 14 
 
Following 202 203 241 176 
 
4 7 2 
Exp. 2 First 293 271 349 241 
 
19 22 17 
 
Following 208 221 263 173 
 
12 15 4 
 
 
Fig. 2. Central results of the pizza task to measure cognitive conflict during motivated 
rule-violation behavior in Experiment 1. Left panel: Histogram of the individual 
proneness to violate rules, accompanied by the German road sign for one-way roads. 
Bins are labelled in terms of their upper boundary and the experimental design permitted 
up to a maximum of 70 violations. Right panel: Inter-keystroke intervals at four different 
positions during a violation trial of the pizza task. First violation data refer to the very first 
violation committed in the experiment (when participants did not yet know what to expect 
when entering the one-way road) whereas the data labeled as “following violations” 
represents the mean of all subsequent violations. Keystroke types are coded for different 
responses within a trial in which the participant had committed a violation. Error-bars are 
standard errors of paired differences (SEPD), computed separately for each keystroke 
type. For additional data and analyses, see Figure S1 in the Supplementary Material. 
 
Correlation of cognitive conflict and violation frequency 
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To test Hypothesis 2, i.e., to probe for the hypothesized negative correlation of 
cognitive conflict during deliberate rule violations and the individual’s proneness to violate 
rules, we computed a conflict index to capture the net effect of rule-violation behavior on 
performance. To this end we subtracted the mean inter-keystroke interval when passing 
through a one-way road from the mean interval when entering the road for the repeated 
violation condition of each participant. To further account for confounds due to variation in 
overall response speed, we normalized this difference by dividing it by the participant’s 
mean inter-keystroke interval averaged across all four conditions. The conflict index was 
correlated with the number of one-way violations across participants, r = -0.29, 
t(46) = 2.05, p = .045 (see Figure S1 in the Supplementary Material). Follow-up tests 
revealed that this correlation was mainly due to systematically prolonged inter-keystroke 
intervals when entering the one-way road: When computing separate correlations for the 
comparison of inter-keystroke intervals when entering the one-way road relative to the 
baseline of violation-unrelated responses, and for the comparison of inter-keystroke 
intervals when passing through the one-way, we observed a significant correlation only for 
the former case (i.e., entering), r = -0.35, t(46) = 2.52, p = .015, but not for the latter case 
(i.e., passing), r = 0.03, t(46) = 0.20, p = .846.  
Discussion 
The findings of Experiment 1 lend support to both hypotheses of the present study: 
Participants showed reliable signs of cognitive conflict when entering a one-way road in 
the forbidden direction (Hypothesis 1), and the strength of this conflict was negatively 
correlated with the frequency of rule violation choices across participants (Hypothesis 2). 
Based on these initial findings, we attempted to replicate and extend the pattern of results 
in a second experiment.  
Experiment 2 
Experiment 1 had focused on optimizing violations that are motivated by the desire 
to expedite task completion. Even though strong effects of cognitive conflict emerged in 
this setting, it is not clear whether the observation of cognitive conflict would also 
Taking shortcuts  13 
 
generalize to other types of motives, especially when rule violations are committed in the 
face of monetary temptations (Dai et al., 2018; Fischbacher & Föllmi‐Heusi, 2013; 
Gneezy, 2005; Hilbig & Thielmann, 2017). Findings on choice behavior have often 
suggested monetary incentives to exert a strong motivational pull towards cheating 
behavior, creating spontaneous impulses toward rule-violation (Bereby-Meyer & Shalvi, 
2015; Shalvi, Eldar, & Bereby-Meyer, 2012). These observations could be taken to 
suggest that the promise of monetary incentives reduces or even overrides cognitive 
conflict. At the same time, cognitive accounts suggest conflict to arise at a considerably 
shorter time-scale than motivational processes so that cognitive conflict may also prevail 
in the presence of monetary temptations (Foerster, Pfister, Schmidts, Dignath, & Kunde, 
2013). Experiment 2 therefore replicated the setup of the preceding experiment but 
introduced monetary incentives – tips for fast deliveries – to study cognitive conflict in 
such tempting situations.5 
Hypotheses were as for Experiment 1 and we thus probed for cognitive conflict as 
measured via inter-keystroke intervals (Hypothesis 1) as well as a negative correlation of 
the strength of this conflict with the frequency of rule violations across participants 
(Hypothesis 2). 
Method 
We performed a direct replication of the pizza task of Experiment 1 with the only 
addition that participants could earn tips for fast deliveries. Instructions did not mention 
this added manipulation, and the program decided between fast (tipped) and slow (non-
tipped) trials based on an adaptive algorithm. This algorithm ensured that participants 
were able to receive tips regardless of whether or not they violated rules, though violating 
improved the chances of obtaining tips in a given trial. To this end, the two experimental 
blocks were further divided into sub-blocks of 10 trials. For every sub-block, the mean 
delivery time was computed upon completion, and deliveries were tipped if a delivery was 
completed faster than the mean minus 1 SD of the previous sub-block. After a tipped 
delivery, the experiment displayed “You were quick and got a tip” plus their accumulated 
                                                          
5 We thank the action editor and an anonymous reviewer for stimulating this experiment. 
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tip that they earned during the whole experiment. To allow for this feedback, the inter-trial-
interval was changed from 1000 ms to 3000 ms. Participants earned 1.85 € in tips on 
average. 
Seventy-two new participants were recruited and received either course credit or 
monetary reimbursement of 5 € (before tips). This sample size ensures a power of 1 - β  
> .99 for detecting cognitive conflict effects as observed in the inter-keypress intervals of 
Experiment 1 when assuming similar drop-out as in the preceding experiment. The 
sample comprised 65 females, 6 left-handers (one participant did not disclose 
handedness) and the participants’ mean age was 26.3 years (range: 19-61 years).  
Results 
Cognitive conflict during one-way violations 
As for Experiment 1, we first examined the distribution of one-way violations 
across participants (Fig. 3, left panel). This distribution again exhibited two separate 
modes, one at the lower end of the scale and one at the upper end, though markedly 
fewer participants opted not to commit a single rule violation. Statistical assessment 
showed the distribution not to be unimodal as indicated by a bimodality coefficient of 
b = .673, supported by a significant dip-test, dip = 0.082, p < .001. 
To test Hypothesis 1, i.e., to probe for cognitive conflict as captured via inter-
keystroke intervals, we again performed a 4 x 2 repeated-measures ANOVA with the 
factors keystroke type (violation-unrelated, before violation, entering one-way, passing 
through one-way) and violation order (first vs. following violations; see Fig. 3 and Tab. 1 
for corresponding descriptive statistics). A sub-sample of 52 participants was available for 
this analysis following the same criteria as described for Experiment 1, and we excluded 
2.8% of the inter-keystroke intervals as outliers. 
Like in Experiment 1, we observed a main effect of keystroke type, F(3, 
153) = 15.67 (ε = .60), p < .001, ηp2 = .24, driven by slow responses when initiating the 
violation and by short inter-keystroke intervals while passing through the one-way (as 
compared to violation-unrelated responses). Additionally, keystrokes during the first 
violation trial were overall slower than those of the remaining trials, F(1, 51) = 45.70, 
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p < .001, ηp2 = .47, whereas the interaction of keystroke type and violation order did not 
interact for Experiment 2, F(3, 153) = 0.98 (ε = .73), p = .384, ηp2 = .02. Separate pairwise 
comparisons indicated that the inter-keystroke interval when entering the one-way was 
significantly longer than violation-unrelated inter-keystroke intervals for the first violation 
(Δ = 56 ms), t(51) = 2.47, p = .017, d = 0.34, as well as for the following violations (Δ = 56 
ms), t(51) = 3.78, p < .001, d = 0.52. Similarly, inter-keystroke intervals while passing the 
one-way were significantly shorter than unrelated ones for the first violation (Δ = -52 ms), 
t(51) = -3.02, p = .004, d = -0.42, and also for the following violations (Δ = -43 ms), t(51) = -
7.79, p < .001, d = -1.08. The difference between unrelated inter-keystroke intervals and 
inter-keystroke intervals right before the violation did not approach significance for either 
comparison (ps > .258). 
 
 
Fig. 3. Results of Experiment 2. Left panel: Histogram of the individual proneness to 
violate rules. Bins are labeled in terms of their upper boundary with a maximum of 70 
violations being permitted by the experimental design. Right panel: Inter-keystroke 
intervals for the four different conditions during a violation trial of the pizza task (see also 
Fig. 2). Error-bars are standard errors of paired differences (SEPD), computed separately 
for each keystroke type. For additional data and analyses, see Figure S2 in the 
Supplementary Material. 
 
Correlation of cognitive conflict and violation frequency 
To test Hypothesis 2, i.e., to probe for the hypothesized negative correlation of 
cognitive conflict during deliberate rule violations and the individual’s proneness to violate 
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rules, we computed a conflict index as for Experiment 1. The conflict index was again 
correlated with the number of one-way violations across participants, r = -0.40, 
t(50) = 3.16, p = .003 (see Figure S2 in the Supplementary Material). Likewise, this 
correlation mainly derived from prolonged inter-keystroke intervals when entering the one-
way road relative to baseline, r = -0.37, t(46) = 2.78, p = .007, and not from the shorter 
inter-keystroke intervals when passing through the one-way road, r = 0.15, t(46) = 1.08, p 
= .284. 
Discussion 
In Experiment 2, participants were able to earn extra money (“tips”) when they 
delivered a pizza quickly. This additional monetary incentive was introduced to further 
motivate participants to use forbidden shortcuts by entering a one-way road in the wrong 
direction on top of the benefit of faster task completion. 
Importantly, we still observed cognitive conflict in terms of longer inter-keystroke 
intervals when participants just entered the one-way road (Hypothesis 1). The results 
further replicated the negative correlation of the strength of this conflict and the frequency 
of rule violations (Hypothesis 2), corroborating the results obtained in Experiment 1. 
Two observations depart from the previous results, however. First, we did no 
longer observe an interaction of keystroke type and violation order. For Experiment 1, this 
interaction had derived from especially large costs when entering a forbidden one-way 
road for the first time, an effect that is likely due to the uncertainty associated with this 
response. It seems tempting to attribute this different pattern of results to the stronger 
motivational pull offered by the additional monetary incentive (Shalvi et al., 2012) which 
seems to render participants more resilient to uncertainty while it does not overcome the 
associated cognitive costs.6 The second observation pertains to the slightly altered shape 
of the distribution of violation choices across participants: Whereas a sizeable proportion 
of the participants in Experiment 1 had not committed a single violation throughout the 
entire session, most participants of Experiment 2 opted to violate the rules at least in a 
                                                          
6 The first violation condition necessarily comes with rather noisy data especially for the keystrokes 
before and when entering the one-way, because each participant contributed exactly a single inter-
keystroke interval here.  
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small fraction of the trials. Note, however, that the mean number of violation choices did 
not differ between experiments as suggested by a post-hoc comparison of both data sets 
with an average of 33.8 violations per participant in Experiment 1 versus 31.4 violations in 
Experiment 2, t(142) = 0.56, p = .575, dz = 0.09. On the one hand, this result may be 
taken to suggest that the size of the monetary incentives might not have been attractive 
enough for our participants to instigate violation behavior after receiving tips for fast 
delivieries. Whether or not decisions for dishonesty depend on the amount of possible 
payoffs is still under debate at present with several studies showing an impact of payoff 
magnitude (Gneezy, Rockenbach, & Serra-Garcia, 2013; Hilbig, & Thielmann, 2017) while 
other studies yielded evidence for the contrary (Fischbacher & Föllmi-Heusi, 2013; 
Harkrider et al., 2013). The question of whether or not higher payoff magnitudes would 
alter the cognitive effects of rule-violation behavior thus calls for additional empirical 
clarification. If one assumes that higher payoffs would not qualitatively alter this pattern, 
the differing distributions of violation frequencies resonate with the idea that monetary 
incentives may reduce the impact of uncertainty, thus promoting the chance of observing 
at least one violation response, while not negating other consequences of rule violation 
behavior such as cognitive conflict.  
 
General Discussion 
The current study set out to bridge cognitive approaches to rule-violation behavior 
with motivational approaches as they have been put forward in applied psychology and 
behavioral economics. We studied rule-violation behavior in a task that allowed for short-
cutting through one-way roads while participants were to deliver a virtual pizza as quickly 
as possible. Cognitive conflict during rule-violation behavior was assessed by analyzing 
the effects of rule violations on continuous task performance while decision biases toward 
rule-breaking were assessed in terms of the overall frequency of overt rule violations. 
From a motivational perspective, Experiment 1 focused on optimizing violations, i.e., 
participants were able to expedite task completion when using one-way roads in the 
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forbidden direction. Experiment 2 built on this setup but introduced additional monetary 
incentives by offering tips for quick deliveries. We hypothesized that cognitive conflict 
would emerge also for unsolicited rule violations as operationalized in both experiments 
(Hypothesis 1) and we further expected the strength of this conflict to go along with fewer 
instances of rule violation behavior (Hypothesis 2). The results supported both hypotheses 
and we will discuss these findings in the following. 
Conflict and its underlying mechanisms 
The analyses of inter-keystroke intervals while participants navigated through the 
city mazes indicated a systematic slow-down when participants just entered a one-way 
road in the forbidden direction. We propose that at least for repeated violations, this 
performance decrement indicates a tug-of-war between automatic tendencies to behave 
in a rule-based manner (i.e., to turn around and take an accepted route) and the 
deliberate action plan of moving into the one-way road. 
Cognitive research on how rules are represented has indeed indicated that rules 
are retrieved automatically in the face of rule-related stimuli. This work typically used 
simple classification rules that prescribed the correct response for certain sets of target 
stimuli. Encountering any of the stimuli has been shown to retrieve the associated 
responses even for the very first instance of a stimulus-response episode (Cohen-
Kdoshay & Meiran, 2007; Kunde, Kiesel, & Hoffmann, 2003; Wenke, Gaschler, & 
Nattkemper, 2007), suggesting that rule-based behavior is retrieved automatically even in 
cases when this behavior does not conform to the agent’s current intentions (Dreisbach, 
2012). Cognitive conflict during rule-violation behavior thus arises due to the concurrent 
activation of both, rule-based and rule-violating action tendencies. 
The concurrent activation of two opposing action tendencies likely parallels 
findings on the cognitive psychology of lying, where research has highlighted an initial 
tendency toward truthful responding that needs to be overcome to successfully tell a lie 
(Debey et al., 2014; Foerster, Wirth, Kunde, & Pfister, 2017; Spence et al., 2001; for a 
recent review, see Suchotzki, Verschuere, Van Bockstaele, Ben-Shakhar, & Crombez, 
2017). Whether or not this analogy can be taken to suggest similar processing of lying on 
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the one hand and non-deceptive rule violations on the other hand remains to be explored. 
For instance, motivational accounts have stressed that lying may become the default 
response given sufficient self-interest in the outcome of the lie (Verschuere & Shalvi, 
2014; Bereby-Meyer & Shalvi, 2015). Along the same lines, it has been shown that 
frequent lying can facilitate dishonest responding to a degree that it appears to become 
the default response (Van Bockstaele et al., 2012; Verschuere, Spruyt, Meijer, & Otgaar, 
2011; for the crucial role of lying recency in this context, see Foerster et al., 2018). Similar 
results were observed when participants received an explicit false alibi when lying about 
recently performed actions (Foerster, Wirth, Herbort, Kunde, & Pfister, 2017). By contrast, 
the violation of arbitrary stimulus-response mapping rules appears not to be malleable to a 
similar degree and may at times even yield increased cognitive conflict when violations 
are performed frequently (Wirth, Foerster, Herbort, Kunde, & Pfister, 2018). Similarly, lying 
typically involves an attempt to conceal the true answer in a communicative setting, which 
may impose additional processing demands as compared to instances of rule-breaking 
that do not hinge on communication and successful concealment. Possible commonalities 
and differences regarding the representation and processing of lying as compared other 
types of rule- and norm-violation therefore wait for empirical clarification. 
Further open questions relate to other potential contributions to the conflict effects 
observed in the present experiments. It is conceivable that the effects of rule violation on 
inter-keystroke intervals capture additional factors such as moral considerations relating to 
the participants’ self-image (Mazar et al., 2008; Moore & Gino, 2015). Another process 
that might contribute to the prolonged inter-keystroke intervals when entering the one-way 
road is that participants tried to pre-plan the entire movement episode in advance. This 
assumption might also explain the systematic speed-up when passing through the one-
way. Alternatively, or in addition, this speed-up might be attributed to negative affect that 
has been shown to accompany rule-violation behavior (Wirth, Foerster, Rendel, Kunde, & 
Pfister, 2018), as participants can be assumed to be motivated to avoid such negative 
affective states. 
Conflict and choice 
Taking shortcuts  20 
 
The distribution of rule violations across participants showed pronounced inter-
individual differences with a clear bimodal shape: Participants either used very few 
forbidden shortcuts or they used many, whereas medium frequencies did not occur as 
often. This finding is in line with previous individual-differences approaches to cheating, 
which identified subgroups of mostly honest or “incorruptible” participants that are distinct 
from other subgroups whose members were more prone to cheating if cheating behavior 
promised sufficient payoffs (Fischbacher & Föllmi‐Heusi, 2013; Hilbig & Thielmann, 2017; 
Hilbig & Zettler, 2015). 
Importantly, the frequency of rule-violation choices was correlated with cognitive 
conflict as measured via inter-keystroke intervals. This finding resonates with previous 
observations regarding rule-violation in simple classification tasks (Pfister et al., 2016a). 
Furthermore, such cognitive conflict has been shown to be absent for convicted criminals, 
i.e., individuals with a long history of repeated and severe rule-breaking (Jusyte et al., 
2017).  
In light of these findings, it seems worthwhile to consider the causal mechanisms 
underlying such correlations. That is: Do frequent violations reduce the associated conflict 
or, conversely, does anticipated conflict discourage rule-breaking? Regarding the first 
possibility, frequently committing rule violations has indeed been shown to reduce the 
cognitive costs associated with this behavior (given that a rule has been violated 
frequently and just recently), so that this mechanism likely accounts at least for a share of 
the observed correlation (Verschuere et al., 2011; Foerster et al., 2018). Regarding the 
second possibility, previous studies have argued that anticipating cognitive conflict may be 
a driving force behind decisions whether to violate a rule or not (Pfister et al., 2016a). 
Such an interpretation is tempting also for the present results, especially because it 
follows recent claims that human agents are highly sensitive to the cognitive effort that 
has to be invested in an upcoming task (Kool, McGuire, Rosen, & Botvinick, 2010). It thus 
seems likely that individuals who anticipated stronger cognitive costs are indeed deterred 
from committing a violation, suggesting that both proposed mechanisms work in concert. 
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The frequency of rule violations also correlated with the subjective feeling of guilt in 
the context of rule-violation behavior (at least for Experiment 1; see Supplementary Figure 
S1 and S2). This finding resonates with theories that propose rule-violation behavior to 
arise only if the potential gains outweigh negative side-effects related to the agent’s self-
perception (Hochman, Glöckner, Fiedler, & Ayal, 2016; Mazar et al., 2008; Shalvi, 
Handgraaf, & De Dreu, 2011). These theories postulate that most human agents intend to 
maintain a positive and moral self-image. Rule-violation behavior (especially lying and 
cheating) threatens this self-image and such threats are only condoned if the anticipated 
gains through a rule violation are sufficiently large. The present study calls for an 
extension of such psychological frameworks of rule-violation behavior by showing that rule 
violations do not only entail moral costs but that they also come with robust cognitive 
costs that emerge right before and while the agent deliberately violates a rule. 
Conclusions 
The present study shows that unsolicited, motivated rule violations yield cognitive 
conflict, because agents cannot suppress rule-based tendencies that are automatically 
activated upon encountering rule-related stimuli. These findings suggest that cognitive 
conflict is a robust and reliable downstream consequence of rule violation in many 
different contexts and they promote an agent-centered view on the cognitive, motivational, 
and affective processes that occur in the acting agent right at the moment a rule violation 
takes place. 
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Author note 
Experiment 1 was reported in condensed form as part of the first author’s PhD 
thesis (Pfister, 2013), and we are indebted to the dedicated students of the experimental 
lab course of the winter semester of 2012/13 who performed this experiment. The 
computer program for the employed pizza task was written during an unexpected 
overnight stay at Washington Dulles International Airport, due to an apparent lack of 
usable shortcuts when queueing for customs. 
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Supplementary Material: Experiment 1 
 
Background 
 
As an additional, exploratory question, we 
probed whether the individual proneness to 
commit optimizing violations as measured in 
the pizza task would not only correlate with 
cognitive conflict as described in the article, but 
also whether it may reflect the operation of 
more basic, low-level processes that have 
been discussed as cognitive shortcuts. Such 
shortcuts range from explicit, strategic 
shortcuts in mental arithmetic (Haider & 
Frensch, 1996, 1999) and heuristics in 
decision making (Pachur & Bröder, 2013; 
Tversky & Kahnemann, 1974) to implicit 
categorization shortcuts (Pashler & Baylis, 
1991). 
The different types of cognitive shortcuts 
have in common that they reflect a consistent 
tendency to not perform certain operations 
(deliberate reasoning, rule-based action 
selection) if the current situations allows for 
omitting them. Following attempts to ground 
higher-level processes in the operation of basic 
perception-action mechanisms such as a 
potential relation between attentional control 
and creativity (Zmigrod, Zmigrod, & Hommel, 
2015), we tested whether the individual 
tendency to employ cognitive shortcuts would 
predict the participant’s proneness to rule-
related shortcutting behavior. To measure 
cognitive shortcuts, we assessed implicit 
categorization shortcuts that are used to avoid 
effortful response-selection processes (Pashler 
& Baylis, 1991). 
Cognitive shortcuts are typically observed 
in choice reaction tasks in which participants 
respond to target stimuli in a succession of 
trials. In this case, we opted to present the 
faces of different celebrities as target stimuli 
and will therefore refer to this task as the 
celebrity task. If the current target stimulus 
matches the stimulus that was encountered in 
the preceding trial (stimulus repetitions), 
responses are typically much faster than with 
changing stimuli. This finding has been taken 
to indicate that the time-consuming 
categorization of the target stimulus is skipped 
when a stimulus is repeated (Bertelson, 1963; 
Pashler & Baylis, 1991; see also Tan & Dixon, 
2011). Categorization shortcuts can thus be 
construed as a tendency to not select an 
appropriate response according to a specific 
mapping rule, but rather bypass this rule by 
relying on memory traces that are still active. 
The cognitive shortcuts in the 
categorization task and in the pizza task 
arguably differ in many regards: Categorization 
shortcuts take place on a scale of a few 
hundred milliseconds and they are rarely 
employed deliberately (Pashler & Baylis, 
1991), whereas the type of rule violations 
studied here takes place on a larger timescale 
and – assuming that participants are aware of 
the salient one-way signs – are based on a 
deliberate decision to violate this rule. Despite 
these differences, categorization shortcuts and 
optimizing violations have in common that the 
agent reaches a desired end – a correct 
categorization or successful performance, 
respectively – by other means than suggested 
by the task at hand. We therefore predicted 
that the individual tendency to violate rules in 
the pizza task would not only be negatively 
related to measures of cognitive conflict in this 
task, but that it would also be positively related 
to the individual tendency to exploit stimulus 
repetitions in the celebrity task. 
 
Supplementary Method 
 
Celebrity task: categorization shortcuts 
 
For the celebrity task, participants 
responded with the keys J, K, and L of a 
standard computer keyboard, operated by the 
index, middle, and ring finger of the right hand. 
The keys were marked with colored patches 
(orange, green, and white) and instructions 
always referred to these colors. Target stimuli 
were grayscale portraits of six celebrities (3.5 
cm x 3.5 cm) that appeared on a 17’’ monitor. 
All six celebrities were likely to be well-known 
among German university students: Angela 
Merkel (German chancellor), Queen Elizabeth 
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II., Angelina Jolie (actress), Günther Jauch 
(German quizmaster), Johnny Depp (actor), 
and Dirk Nowitzki (Würzburgian basketball 
player). Two portraits, one male and one 
female, were mapped to each response key 
and the stimulus-response mapping was 
counterbalanced across participants. 
Each trial simply featured a target stimulus 
and participants were to respond as quickly 
and accurately as possible with the assigned 
key. The stimulus remained on screen until a 
response was given and wrong responses 
triggered error feedback for 1500 ms. The next 
trial started after 500 ms; responses during the 
inter-trial interval produced an error message. 
Participants worked through eleven blocks 
of 54 trials each (i.e., each stimulus was 
displayed nine times per block in a random 
order) and feedback after each block informed 
the participants about their mean response 
time (RT) and the number of errors to ensure a 
high motivation. The first block was considered 
practice and did not enter the analyses. 
 
Ad-hoc questionnaire 
 
We further administered a short ad-hoc 
questionnaire (in German language) after the 
experiment that probed for the participant’s 
attitude towards rule violations. It featured 
three questions that could be answered on a 
visual analogue scale (length: 7.1 cm) with 
verbal anchors at both ends. The first question 
translated to “If you violate a rule, how guilty do 
you feel?” (‘feeling guilty’; not very guilty to 
very guilty) whereas the second question 
targeted directly how prone participants were 
to committing violations: “How often do you 
violate rules?” (‘subjective frequency’; very 
rarely to very frequently). The final question 
translates to “How strongly would you 
condemn others for breaking a rule on 
purpose?” (‘condemn others’, not very much to 
very strongly). 
 
Supplementary Results 
 
Celebrity task: Cognitive shortcuts 
 
For analysis of the celebrity task, we only 
considered RTs of correct trials (errors 
occurred in 5.3% of all trials) and also 
excluded the first trial of each block and trials 
that were preceded by errors to avoid 
confounding effects due to restart costs and 
error processing. RTs that deviated by more 
than 2.5 standard deviations from their cell 
mean were discarded as outliers (3.0%). 
The remaining RTs were aggregated to 
separate means for the three conditions of 
interest: stimulus repetitions (444 ms), 
response repetitions (614 ms), and complete 
alternations (602 ms). These means differed 
significantly, as indicated by a repeated-
measures analysis of variance (ANOVA), F(2, 
142) = 331.84, p < .001, ηp2 = .82. The critical 
effect for the current study, however, was not 
the omnibus ANOVA but rather the pairwise 
comparison of complete alternations and 
stimulus repetitions. Considered separately, 
this repetition benefit (RTComplete Alternation – 
RTStimulus Repetition) amounted to sizeable 158 ms 
and was significantly different from zero, t(71) 
= 22.90, p < .001, d = 2.70. 
 
Correlational analyses 
 
As for the evaluation of the participants’ 
proneness to committing optimizing violations 
and its relation to measures from within the 
pizza task, we performed correlational 
analyses between the individual number of 
violations and four additional predictor 
variables (see Figure S1 and Table S1). 
The first predictor was a repetition index 
as derived from the celebrity task. We 
computed this index by normalizing the 
individual repetition benefits at the participant’s 
mean RT (repetition index = repetition benefit / 
mean RT * 100). 
The remaining three predictors were the 
ratings for the three questions in the ad-hoc 
questionnaire (feeling guilty, subjective 
frequency, and condemn others; measured in 
% of the visual analogue scale). 
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Fig. S1. Results of the correlational analyses. Upper row: Bivariate correlations between 
an individual’s proneness to violate rules, the conflict index as a measure of cognitive 
conflict during rule violations, and the repetition index as a measure for the use of 
cognitive shortcuts. Middle row: Bivariate correlations between an individual’s proneness 
to violate rules and the subjective ratings on the post-experimental questionnaire. Lower 
row: Intercorrelations of the three questionnaire items. 
 
 
 
The only significant predictor of the 
number of violations in this analysis was the 
subjective guilt when committing violations, r = 
-0.25, t(70) = -2.16, p = .034, with a regression 
line equating to ŷ = -0.26 • x + 49.65. 
Accordingly, participants committed less one-
way violations, the more they rated themselves 
to generally feel guilty after having violated a 
rule. Importantly, the repetition index was not 
related to the number of one-way violations. To 
evaluate whether these data can indeed be 
taken to indicate the absence of a correlation 
(rather than insensitivity due to the current 
sample size), we further computed the 95% 
confidence interval around the two latter 
coefficients. This was done by applying the 
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Tab. A1. Pairwise correlations of the repetition index as a measure for the 
individual proneness to taking cognitive shortcuts, the ad-hoc-questionnaire 
administered after the experiment, and the number of violations committed 
by a participant in the pizza task (violation count). The upper diagonal of 
the table lists correlation coefficients (significant correlations are in italics) 
whereas the lower diagonal gives the corresponding p-values. All 
correlations are based on the entire sample of n = 72 participants of Exp. 1. 
 
Repetition 
Index 
Feeling 
Guilty 
Subjective 
Frequency 
Condemn 
Others  
Violation 
Count 
Repetition 
Index 
 
-0.28 0.16 -0.01  0.00 
Feeling 
Guilty .015 
 
-0.49 0.30  -0.25 
Subjective 
Frequency .169 <.001 
 
-0.28  0.10 
Condemn 
Others .901 .010 .017 
  
-0.07 
  
     Violation 
Count .981 .034 .395 .560 
   
 
 
 Fisher-Z transformation, computing the 
confidence interval in Z-space as 𝑍𝑍 ± 1.96 ∙
1
√72−3
, and re-transforming the resulting 
boundaries to correlation coefficients. This 
procedure resulted in a 95% confidence 
interval of [-0.32; 0.14] for the correlation of the 
repetition benefit (i.e., the raw scores as 
measured in ms) and the number of violations 
(r = -0.09) and a confidence interval of [-0.23; 
0.23] for the correlation of the repetition index 
(i.e., the repetition benefit relative to the overall 
RT level) and the number of violations (r = 
0.00). Both confidence intervals clearly exclude 
the minimum expected value of r = +0.30. 
 
Supplementary Discussion 
 
The tendency to violate rules in the pizza 
task seems to be independent of cognitive 
categorization shortcuts as measured in the 
celebrity task. These observations suggest that 
deliberate decisions to violate rules might not 
be traced back to very basic cognitive 
shortcuts. Thus, at least for the current 
operationalization of rule violations and 
cognitive shortcuts, it does not seem as if the 
deliberate decisions leading to a routine or 
optimizing violation (Reason, 1990, 1995) drew 
on rather automatic, low-level shortcuts that 
bypass certain categorization processes 
(Pashler & Baylis, 1991; Tan & Dixon, 2011). 
Instead, the subjective assessment of possible 
consequences that might result from rule 
violations (i.e., felt guilt) seems to determine 
whether an optimizing violation is committed or 
not. 
Aside from methodological problems of 
interpreting non-significant results, it seems 
worthwhile to consider a possible alternative 
explanation that might also explain the present 
null-correlation between the number of rule 
violations and the repetition benefit as an index 
of cognitive shortcuts. Clearly, the number of 
rule violations is a rather discrete measure of 
how often a decision process converged on 
one or the other option (resulting in a rule 
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violation or rule-based behavior). By contrast, 
the repetition benefit seems to be a 
continuous, performance-based measure 
because it is based on differences between 
mean RTs in two conditions. The null-
correlation could thus partly be driven by 
different information captured by each 
measure (the outcome of a process vs. the 
speed of a process). This conclusion seems 
premature, though. Rather, Pashler and Baylis 
(1991) argue that the repetition benefit does 
not indicate a genuine speedup of response 
selection but rather a shortcut that actually 
skips response selection processes (for similar 
views, see Dehaene, 1996; Smith, 1968; 
Smith, Chase, & Smith, 1973; Tan & Dixon, 
2011). 
Even though repetition effects are likely to 
entail additional components (e.g., Soetens, 
1998; Sommer, Leuthold, & Soetens 1999), the 
assumed shortcut would imply a rather discrete 
mechanism that either takes place (creating a 
repetition benefit in a given trial) or not. 
Following this logic, differences in repetition 
benefits across participants can be seen as a 
measure of how often a shortcut it used. The 
applied correlation analysis thus seems to be 
methodologically sound and the non-significant 
result might indeed suggest independent 
processes. 
The frequency of rule violations was, 
however, predicted by the subjective feeling of 
guilt in the context of rule-violation behavior.1 
This finding is in accordance with theories that 
propose rule-violation behavior to arise only if 
the potential gains outweigh negative side-
effects related to the agent’s self-perception as 
outlined in the article (Mazar, Amir, & Ariely, 
2008). 
                                                          
1 The correlation coefficient for self-reported guilt 
and the frequency of committed rule violations was 
only modest in size. This points to additional 
influences though the present effect size should 
also be seen in the context of a possibly limited 
reliability of single-item data. 
Supplementary Material: Experiment 2 
 
Participants of Experiment 2 were not asked to 
perform the celebrity task so that we restricted 
the follow-up analyses on correlations between 
the participants’ proneness to violate rules (i.e., 
their violation frequency) and the three items of 
the ad-hoc questionnaire. 
The questionnaire was identical to the one 
used in the preceding experiment and 
contained the questions “If you violate a rule, 
how guilty do you feel?” (‘feeling guilty’; not 
very guilty to very guilty), “How often do you 
violate rules?” (‘subjective frequency’; very 
rarely to very frequently), and “How strongly 
would you condemn others for breaking a rule 
on purpose?” (‘condemn others’, not very 
much to very strongly). Two participants had to 
be removed from the analysis because they 
failed to answer the questionnaire so that all 
correlational analyses of the questionnaire 
data are based on a sample size of n = 70 
participants. 
Figure S2 shows bivariate scatterplots for 
all variable combinations, and Table A2 lists 
the resulting pairwise correlations. Though the 
general pattern of results resembled the 
correlational data of Experiment 1, there were 
slight differences in terms of which correlation 
reached the conventional level of significant. 
That is, in contrast to Experiment 1, subjective 
guilt only showed a non-significant trend 
toward a negative correlation with the number 
of rule violations, whereas moderate 
correlations emerged for the subjective 
frequency and condemn others. 
To follow up on these somewhat diverging 
results, we pooled the data of both 
experiments to re-assess all relevant 
correlations with higher power. This overall 
analysis yielded small but significant bivariate 
correlations of all three questionnaire items 
with the individual violation frequency; guilt: r = 
-0.21, t(170) = 2.55, p = .013, subjective 
frequency: r = 0.27, t(170) = 3.40, p = .001, 
condemn others: r = -0.19, t(170) = 2.29, p = 
.024. 
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Fig. S2. Results of the correlational analyses of Experiment 2. Upper row: Bivariate 
correlation between an individual’s proneness to violate rules and the conflict index as a 
measure of cognitive conflict during rule violations. Middle row: Bivariate correlations 
between an individual’s proneness to violate rules and the subjective ratings on the post-
experimental questionnaire. Lower row: Intercorrelations of the three questionnaire items. 
 
Tab. A2. Pairwise correlations of the ad-hoc-questionnaire and the number 
of violations committed by a participant in the pizza task (violation count) of 
Exp. 2. The upper diagonal of the table lists correlation coefficients 
whereas the lower diagonal gives the corresponding p-values. 
 
Feeling 
Guilty 
Subjective 
Frequency 
Condemn 
Others  
Violation 
Count 
Feeling 
Guilty  -0.36 0.45  -0.18 
Subjective 
Frequency .002 
 
-0.35  0.46 
Condemn 
Others <.001 .003 
  
-0.29 
 
     Violation 
Count .134 <.001 .013 
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